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I. INTRODUCTION
Few courts have dealt directly with the issue of whether to protect
an employee’s production of confidential documents in Title VII
retaliation litigation.1 Despite the lack of case law, the conflict is very
* The author would like to thank Prof. Stefan J. Padfield of The University of Akron School of Law
for his immense help in preparing this article for publication. The author would also like to thank
Prof. Richard L. Aynes of The University of Akron School of Law for his insightful comments.
1. Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 722 (6th Cir. 2008). At the Sixth Circuit,
Niswander was argued before Judges Gilman, Rogers, and McKeague. Id. Title VII’s anti-
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real.2 On one hand, employers want to protect themselves from the
improper or unnecessary dissemination of confidential documents in
connection with a Title VII lawsuit. On the other hand, employees have
a statutory right to participate in the charging process and to oppose
unlawful employer conduct, which often involves confidential corporate
documents.3
When an employer terminates an employee for disseminating
confidential documents, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision provides
the employee with protection for two types of activity: participation and
opposition.4 Generally, the provision grants more protection to a person
who is participating in a lawsuit than to one who is merely opposing
5
unlawful conduct. But, courts have struggled to interpret the breadth of
the participation clause.6

retaliation provision forbids any employer from discriminating against any of its employees because
the employee opposed any practice made unlawful under Title VII, or because the employee made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under Title VII. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) (2008).
2. See Niswander, 529 F.3d 714. Besides Niswander, other examples include O'Day v.
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., where an employee rummaged through files in his supervisor’s
office, copied several documents, and showed them to fellow employees. 79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir.
1996). In Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., an employee copied information from a book that was left
out in the open and disclosed that information to counsel. No. C-1-03-033, 2005 WL 3448036 (S.D.
Ohio Dec.15, 2005). In Kempcke v. Monsanto Co., an employee was fired for refusing to return
confidential documents he provided to his attorney. 132 F.3d 442 (8th Cir. 1998). Finally, in Shoaf
v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., an employee provided a coworker who was participating in a Title VII
action with safety violation reports, personnel information, and emails. 294 F. Supp. 2d 746, 752
(M.D.N.C. 2003).
3. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 726. In Niswander, the Sixth Circuit attempted to balance the
employer’s “legitimate and substantial interest in keeping its personnel records and agency
documents confidential” while protecting the employee's need to produce documents in discovery.
Id. (quoting Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036 (5th Cir. 1980)).
4. 45A Am. Jur. 2d Job Discrimination § 215; see infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text
describing the difference between participation and opposition.
5. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 726. Typically, opposition activity must be reasonable for the
anti-retaliation provision to apply. Id. On the other hand, participation activity is generally not held
to a standard of reasonableness. Id.
6. See Marilee L. Miller, Comment, The Employer Strikes Back: The Case for a Broad
Reading of Title VII’s Bar on Retaliation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 505 (2006). Currently, there is a
debate between three standards for determining whether employer conduct constitutes retaliation
under the statute: (1) the Ultimate Employment Actions Standard; (2) the Materially Adverse
Standard; and (3) the Deference Standard/EEOC Standard. Id. at 513-28. The Ultimate
Employment Actions Standard is the strictest approach and limits retaliation protection only to
actions affecting wages, hiring, firing, and demotion. Id. at 513-14. The Materially Adverse
Standard expands protection to actions that materially change the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment. Id. at 515. The EEOC Standard is the most lenient. Id. at 520-22. It focuses on the
effect of the alleged retaliation and expands protection to cover any employer action which deterred
participation. Id.
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In Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., the Sixth Circuit recently ruled
that confidential documents produced in response to a formal production
request must be relevant to the production request in order for the
production to constitute protected participation.7 The Sixth Circuit
analyzes irrelevant document production under the opposition clause
8
using a six-part reasonableness test.
This article is a case note on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Niswander. The position of this note is that for the purpose of
establishing a retaliation claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e3(a), courts should consider the good-faith production of confidential
documents in response to a formal request for discovery as participation
activity, not opposition activity.9 Whether the produced documents are
relevant to a formal discovery request should not factor into the
10
The determining question should be whether
participation analysis.
the employee acted in good faith.11
This note will first describe the factual background of the
Niswander decision and provide a background for Title VII retaliation
litigation.12 Second, it will discuss why Congress intended to allow
irrelevant or provocative activity to be protected under the Title VII anti13
Next, it will argue that a good-faith standard is
retaliation statute.
better than a relevance standard.14 Then, it will contrast the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Niswander with that of other circuits and offer an
15
Finally, it will
alternative method for the Sixth Circuit’s analysis.
examine the possible ramifications that Niswander may have on Title
VII discovery.16
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Factual Background

In December 2003, Kathy Niswander opted-in to a class action
lawsuit claiming that Cincinnati Insurance Co. (“CIC”) discriminated

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
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Niswander, 529 F.3d at 726-27.
Id.; see infra note 39 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 97-231 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 97-231 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 118-60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 17-96 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 104-17 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 118-60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 172-212 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 214-31 and accompanying text.
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against women in violation of the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. §
17
206(d). As part of discovery in the class action, both parties agreed to
a Stipulated Protective Order, which allowed them to exchange
confidential information.18 After joining the class action, Niswander
19
believed that her supervisor retaliated against her, prompting her to file
a retaliation claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) in October 2005.20
As part of the ongoing equal pay litigation, CIC formally requested
21
that Niswander produce documents related to her equal pay claim. The
requests for production were arguably vague and broadly worded.22 One
request stated: “Please produce any and all documents which reflect,
refer or relate to Plaintiff's claims against Cincinnati Insurance
Company, including but not limited to, memoranda, correspondence,
notes, e-mail and faxes to or from any supervisor, manager or employee
of Cincinnati Insurance Company.”23 Another request stated: “Please
produce all documents which reflect, relate or concern the allegation of
Plaintiff that Defendant has discriminated against her based on
gender.”24
Niswander believed that the scope of the request included
documents relating to her retaliation claim as well as her equal pay
claim.25 As a result, she subsequently produced confidential documents

17. Final Brief for the Appellant at 7, Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714 (6th Cir.
2008) (No. 07-3738), 2007 WL 5066236.
18. Id. at 8. The protective order provided that “[e]ither party, may at the time of production,
designate such information as ‘confidential’ and the information so designated shall thereafter be
subject to the provisions of this order.” Id.
19. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 717. The summary of the alleged retaliation is as follows: prior
to Niswander joining in the equal pay lawsuit, her supervisor would call once per week and discuss
her work. Id. After Niswander opted-in to the lawsuit, the supervisor stopped calling her. Id. He
would only e-mail Niswander. Id. In September 2004, Niswander filed a complaint of retaliation
with CIC's Human Resources Department. Id. Niswander requested a new supervisor in August of
2005, but her request was denied. Id. Niswander was put on CIC's Progressive Problem Resolution
Program in September of 2005. Id. This was the first time Niswander had been placed in this
program since she began working for CIC in March 1996. Id.
20. Id.
21. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 15.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 718. [Niswander] admitted in her deposition that she had “no
documents to support an equal pay [claim].” Instead, she sent documents that she believed were
relevant to CIC's alleged acts of retaliation against her. Some of the documents that Niswander sent
were copies of e-mail correspondence with her supervisors related to her job performance. Other
documents, however, were claim-file documents that allegedly would jog her memory regarding
instances of retaliation, but that did not, in and of themselves, contain evidence of retaliation. In
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to her lawyers that were wholly unrelated to the equal pay claim.26
Niswander’s lawyers turned the documents over to CIC’s lawyers, who
27
CIC subsequently fired
then turned the documents over to CIC.
Niswander for violating the company’s privacy policy.28 Niswander
filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, claiming
that CIC unlawfully retaliated against Niswander by firing her in
response to the production of documents.29
B.

Procedural History

At the district court level, both CIC and Niswander filed for
summary judgment.30 CIC claimed that it had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing Niswander because she had violated

sending the documents to her lawyers, some of which included information about CIC's
policyholders, Niswander “thought everything was confidential” and that “anything [she] produced
was all between the two attorneys, being Cincinnati Insurance['s attorney] and mine.”
Id.
26. Id. Niswander never actually read the request for production, but instead was acting on
instructions from her lawyers. Id. at 721. Niswander produced the documents at issue specifically
in response to a letter from her lawyer, which stated:
Finally, if you have any documents related to your employment at CIC which you have
not already sent in, please send them immediately. I will also be sending you a letter
about some specific “holes” in our discovery responses which we need to address, but I
also need you to look around your house and office for any documents you think might
be even remotely helpful to our case and send them in right away. If we do not produce
the documents to CIC and cooperate in discovery, we will not be able to use the
documents at all.
Reply Brief for the Appellant at 5-6, Niswander, 529 F.3d 714 (No. 07-3738).
27. Id.
28. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 718. Niswander’s termination letter stated that CIC had “learned
that [Niswander] took confidential and proprietary documents, including documents from claim
files, containing private and confidential information about insureds and claimants without
permission for uses unrelated and unnecessary to the performance of your employment by CIC, in
knowing violation of various company policies.” Id. Niswander based her argument, that CIC’s
proffered non-discriminatory reason for firing her was pre-textual, partly on the fact that CIC did
not treat the documents as confidential. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at *28. Despite
the fact that the stipulated protective order allowed for either party to mark documents as
confidential, CIC never designated the documents as such. Id. This was evidence that the
disclosure of the documents was not sufficient motivation for CIC to fire Niswander. Id.
29. See generally Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 5:06CV1086, 2007 WL 1189350
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2007).
30. Id. at *1. CIC moved for summary judgment on the ground that Niswander could not
establish a prima facie claim of retaliation. Id. at *5. Niswander moved for summary judgment
against CIC’s claim of conversion of its documents. Id. at *13. While both motions were granted,
Niswander’s grant of summary judgment was not appealed. Therefore, conversion of the documents
is not an issue in the Sixth Circuit’s analysis. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 717.
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multiple company policies.31 Niswander argued that CIC implicitly
authorized her disclosure of documents by way of CIC’s formal request
32
for production of documents. Niswander further argued that because
she produced the documents within a formal discovery request, her
activity was protected as participation under Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision.33 The district court granted summary judgment to CIC.34
The key to the district court’s analysis was determining that
35
Niswander’s production of documents was not a protected activity.
Niswander had argued that the production of documents was protected
under Title VII’s participation clause.36 However, after analyzing
37
Watkins v. Ford Motor Company and O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas
38
Helicopter Co., the district court formed its opinion instead under the
opposition clause balancing test formulated in O’Day.39 The court
likened Niswander’s conduct to that of an employee stealing
40
documents and found that Niswander’s production of documents was

31. Niswander, 2007 WL 1189350, at *2. CIC specifically alleged that Niswander’s actions
violated CIC’s Privacy Policy, Code of Conduct, and Conflict of Interest Policies. Id.
32. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at *26. CIC’s privacy policy had an exception
for disclosures authorized by management. Id.
33. Id. at *14-15. The participation clause inarguably provides for broader protection than the
opposition clause. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 720-21.
34. Niswander, 2007 WL 1189350, at *1.
35. Id. at *7.
36. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at *5-6.
37. No. C-1-03-033, 2005 WL 3448036, (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2005).
38. 79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1996).
39. Niswander, 2007 WL 1189350, at *8-10. In the opposition clause analysis of its opinion,
the Sixth Circuit refined the district court’s test and established six factors to weigh in determining
whether the dissemination of documents, in any context, may constitute reasonable opposition
conduct:
(1) how the documents were obtained, (2) to whom the documents were produced, (3)
the content of the documents, both in terms of the need to keep the information
confidential and its relevance to the employee's claim of unlawful conduct, (4) why the
documents were produced, including whether the production was in direct response to a
discovery request, (5) the scope of the employer's privacy policy, and (6) the ability of
the employee to preserve the evidence in a manner that does not violate the employer's
privacy policy.
Niswander, 529 F.3d at 726. See Nicholas Strohmayer, Note, Drawing the Line: Niswander's
Balance Between Employer Confidentiality Interests and Employee Title VII Anti-Retaliation
Rights, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1037 (2010) (critiquing the Sixth Circuit’s six-factor opposition clause
test).
40. Niswander, 2007 WL 1189350, at *7-9. In Watkins, the employee copied confidential
documents he found lying around the office and provided them to his attorney prior to initiating a
lawsuit. Id. In O’Day, the employee obtained documents by rummaging through a drawer in his
supervisor’s office marked private. Id. Unlike Watkins and O’Day, Niswander worked at home and
had possession of all the documents she ultimately turned over. Id. The District Court
acknowledged this fact but determined that, “like the plaintiff in Watkins, [Niswander] began
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unreasonable opposition.41 The district court never analyzed whether
42
Niswander’s conduct was participation under Title VII.
C.

Competing Arguments

On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, CIC successfully argued that
confidential documents produced in discovery must be relevant to the
production request in order to be considered participation under Title
VII’s anti-retaliation statute.43 CIC argued that because Niswander
produced confidential documents, which were not related to the equal
Pay lawsuit, the documents were not actually in response to the
discovery request.44 Thus, Niswander was not participating in the Equal
pay claim when she produced the documents.45 CIC argued, in the
alternative, that even if the court analyzed Niswander’s conduct as
participation, CIC had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason to fire her
because she violated the company’s confidentiality policy.46
looking through those files for specific information relevant and helpful to her future claim of
retaliation, not a business purpose, and provided these confidential documents to her attorney
without Defendant's permission and clearly in violation of Defendant's confidentiality policies of
which she was aware.” Id. at *9.
41. Niswander, 2007 WL 1189350, at *10. (“In applying the balancing test of O'Day to the
instant case, the Court finds that Defendant's interest in ensuring compliance with its policies of
privacy and the law, and maintaining the confidentiality of its clients' personal information
outweighs Plaintiff's interest in preserving what she considered to be evidence of unlawful
retaliation on the part of Defendant. This is so especially in light of the fact that Plaintiff could have
preserved this evidence without violating the law and her employer's policy and trust as she could
have taken notes of the incidents that she felt spurned retaliation instead of taking pictures and
claims file information that jogged her memory of these incidents and giving them to her attorney.
Moreover, this “evidence” that Plaintiff handed over to her attorney does not prove retaliation in
and of itself as Plaintiff herself admitted that the documents that she gave her attorney relating to
claims file information only served to trigger her memory about incidents which she believed
constituted retaliation.”).
42. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 721. The Sixth Circuit even acknowledges that the lower court
inexplicably failed to analyze Niswander’s participation argument. Id.
43. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at *24, Niswander, 529 F.3d 714 (No. 07-3738) 2007 WL
5066233. The Defendant characterizes Niswander’s activity as collecting, removing, and
disseminating confidential documents to a third-party for a non-business purpose. Id. at *22. From
the Defendant’s view, Niswander was not responding to a request for production when she handed
over the documents. See generally, id. She was merely preparing for a future retaliation claim that,
if true, was properly analyzed under an opposition clause analysis. Id. at *23. One flaw in this
logic however, is that Niswander already had a retaliation claim pending with the EEOC. Final Brief
for Appellant, supra note 17, at *7.
44. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 43, at *23-24.
45. Id.
46. Id. at *30-31. The Defendant compared Niswander’s disclosure of confidential
documents with that of the Plaintiff in Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, No. CIV-04-1433-F, 2006 WL
2987728 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 17, 2006). However, in Vaughn the plaintiff’s disclosure was not part of
a formal discovery request. Id. at *2. Like O’Day and Watkins, Vaughn involved disclosure prior
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Niswander countered that her actions constituted participation, not
opposition, and thus the district court erred in analyzing her claim under
47
Niswander reasoned that she was
an opposition clause standard.
participating in the discovery process of an equal pay lawsuit by
48
producing documents in response to a formal request for production.
She just did not understand the scope of the discovery request given to
her.49
Niswander’s lawyer sent her two letters, one of which stated: “If
you have any documents related to your employment at CIC which you
have not already sent in, please send them to me immediately.”50 The
letter continued: “I also need you to look around your house and office
for any documents you think might be even remotely helpful to our case
and send them in right away. If we do not produce the documents to CIC
and cooperate in discovery, we will not be able to use the documents at
all.”51
Niswander acknowledged that the documents produced were
irrelevant to her equal pay claim. However, she believed the produced
documents were in response to an overly broad discovery request.52
Niswander further argued that CIC’s proffered reason for firing her was
pretext because CIC took no steps to mitigate the damage that
Niswander allegedly caused.53 CIC’s attorney in charge of protecting
privacy conducted no investigation of the alleged breach, did not view
the documents that were disclosed, and never informed customers of the
supposed breach of confidentiality.54

to filing a lawsuit. Id. The Defendant also suggested that the participation clause would not protect
Niswander because a violation of company policy is per se bad faith conduct. Brief of DefendantAppellee, supra note 43, at *31. This logic is flawed because it implies that Niswander deliberately
violated the company policy, but Niswander believed she was complying with CIC’s request for
production, thus she did not believe she was violating company policy. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 718.
47. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at *23-24.
48. Id. at *17.
49. See Niswander, 529 F.3d at 718.
50. Id. (emphasis in original). Niswander’s attorney’s alleged failure to properly instruct
Niswander on the scope of discovery is the subject matter of a current malpractice suit. See
Niswander v. Price, Waicukauski & Riley, LLC, No. 1-08-CV-1325 (S.D. Ind. filed Oct. 2, 2008).
51. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 718.
52. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
53. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at *29-30. Niswander argued that CIC should
have taken steps to protect the documents from further dissemination such as mark them as
confidential and place them under the stipulated protective order. Id.
54. Id. at *30.
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Sixth Circuit’s Holding

The Sixth Circuit analyzed Niswander’s actions under both the
opposition clause and the participation clause of Title VII.55 The court
56
But, in
affirmed the lower court’s opposition clause analysis.
analyzing the participation clause, the court held that the production of
confidential documents within a formal request for discovery can be
considered participation for the purposes of establishing a retaliation
claim under Title VII only where the documents are relevant to the
underlying action.57 The court gave two primary reasons for refusing
protection. First, the court was concerned about the employer’s need to
58
Second, the court did not want to
protect confidential information.
immunize any future bad faith conduct of employees.59 If Niswander's
conduct was protected participation, then, employees would have “nearimmunity” for their actions in connection with anti-discrimination
lawsuits.60
Niswander neither appealed for rehearing en banc nor filed a
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
III. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“the Act”) is a legislative milestone
of the Civil Rights Movement.61 Its enactment prohibited discrimination
based on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin62 in many everyday
55. See Niswander, 529 F.3d 714.
56. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Two concurring opinions discuss the weight of
the factors in the O’Day opposition clause analysis. However, because the focus of this note is the
Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the participation clause, a discussion of the opposition clause
analysis or the concurring opinions is omitted. See Niswander, 529 F.3d at 729 (McKeague, J.,
Gilman, J., concurring).
57. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 722. The Sixth Circuit held that “[a]n individual's delivery of
relevant documents during the discovery process or the giving of testimony at a deposition clearly
falls within the ambit of participating . . . in a Title VII proceeding.” Id. (citing Hashimoto v.
Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997)). The Court went on to analyze whether Niswander’s
conduct would constitute opposition activity. However, because this note argues that Niswander’s
production should have been deemed participation, the author will ignore the Court’s analysis of the
opposition clause. See Niswander, 529 F.3d 714.
58. Id. at 722.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts, and the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945, 984 (2005). Indeed, Congress altered the structure of
federalism by deciding that it could regulate private discrimination. Id.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. It is important to note that some forms of sex discrimination are not
outlawed by Title VII. Id. Specifically, where sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for a
job, discrimination in hiring and employing based on sex is still allowed. Id. However, courts
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transactions.63 Title VII of the Act was designed to eliminate
64
discrimination in employment and remains one of the most litigated
65
provisions today.
A.

Retaliation Under Title VII

While Title VII grants considerable protection to an employee from
discrimination, that protection is meaningless if the employer can
retaliate against an employee for making a complaint.66 Title VII’s anti-

narrowly construe this exception and will not extend it to compensation or terms of employment.
See EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding a bona fide
occupational qualification defense does not extend to discriminatory assignment of health insurance
benefits). Oddly enough, the protection against sex discrimination was not originally part of Title
VII, but added in an amendment from Representative Howard Smith, a Democrat from Virginia. Jo
Freeman, How 'Sex' Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW
& INEQ. 163, 174-77 (1990-1991). Smith opposed granting federal civil rights protections, which
led many to believe that the amendment was added as an attempt at killing the legislation. Id.
When the amendment was introduced, many southern Democrats who spoke in favor of adding
protection based on sex eventually voted against the Civil Rights Act. Id. Smith, however,
disagreed with this suggestion and maintained his sincerity towards woman’s rights. Id.
63. See JODY FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22251, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES:
A PRIMER (2005) at *2. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination in regards to voter
registration, public accommodations involved in interstate commerce (motels, restaurants, etc.),
access to public facilities and public schools, agencies receiving federal funding, and employment.
Id. It also expanded the power of the Civil Rights Commission, required reporting of voter
registration data, and eased the requirements for removing civil rights cases to federal courts. Id.
64. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006). “The
antidiscrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are not discriminated against
because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based status.” Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973)).
65. Of the 93,277 charges filed with the EEOC in 2009, 68,710 were Title VII charges.
EEOC Enforcement Statistics, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm and
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm (last visited March 6, 2010). Of the
281 merit suits filed by the EEOC in 2009, 188 were based on Title VII claims. EEOC Litigation
Statistics, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm, (last visited Mar. 6,
2010).
66. Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203-04 (2nd Cir. 2003). Courts have consistently
recognized that the explicit language of § 704(a)'s participation clause is expansive and seemingly
contains no limitations. See, e.g., Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir.
1999) (“The words ‘participate in any manner’ express Congress' intent to confer ‘exceptionally
broad protection’ upon employees covered by Title VII.”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d
561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1052 (2000); Glover v. South Carolina Law
Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court has noted that “[r]ead
naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning,” and thus, as long as “Congress did not add
any language limiting the breadth of that word,” the term “any” must be given literal effect. United
States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997). Id. See also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337
(1997). The overarching purpose of Title VII is to resolve discrimination issues at the local level by
protecting employees who report discrimination to their employers. See id.
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retaliation provision was drafted to address this issue.67 The antiretaliation provision is actually broader in scope than the anti68
discrimination provision. The anti-retaliation provision states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
69
under this subchapter.

A prima facie case of retaliation requires the plaintiff to prove,
among other things, that she engaged in a protected activity and suffered
an adverse employment action as a result of engaging in the protected
activity.70 In analyzing whether an employee has engaged in a protected

67. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. The “purpose of the anti-retaliation
provision is to prevent Title VII claims from being deterred.” Heuer v. Weil-McLain, 203 F.3d
1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 2000).
68. The scope of the anti-retaliation provision extends protection beyond “workplace-related
or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.” Colon-Perez v. Dep’t of Health of Puerto Rico,
623 F. Supp. 2d 230, 241 (D. Puerto Rico 2009) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006)).
The anti-discrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are not
discriminated against because of their status, while the anti-retaliation provision seeks to
prevent an employer from interfering with an employee's efforts to secure or advance
enforcement of the Act's basic guarantees. To secure the first objective, Congress needed
only to prohibit employment-related discrimination. But this would not achieve the
second objective because it would not deter the many forms that effective retaliation can
take, therefore failing to fully achieve the anti-retaliation provision's purpose of
“[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”
Burlington, 548 U.S. at 54 (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346).
69. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a).
70. George Chamberlin, Cause of Action for Discharge from Employment in Retaliation for
the Exercise of Rights Protected by Title VII, 4 C.O.A. 2d 331 § 3 (2010) (1994). See also EEOC
Compliance
Manual,
No.
915.003,
Section
8-II(A),
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.html (last visited March 6, 2010). To establish a prima facie
case of retaliation in the Sixth Circuit, an employee must prove that: (1) he or she engaged in
protected activity, (2) the employer knew of the exercise of the protected right, (3) an adverse
employment action was subsequently taken against the employee, and (4) there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Niswander v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Ct.,
201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000)). This formulation is essentially the same as the EEOC
description. EEOC Compliance Manual, supra. However, the formulation adds the requirement
that the employer must know that the employee was exercising protected rights. Id. A requirement
that an employer know of the employee’s exercise of a protected right is part of the prima facie
retaliation case in some circuits; in others, it is not. Chamberlin, supra. In circuits where employer
knowledge is not a part of the prima facie case, this question is addressed under the causation
element. Id. After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to
the employer to show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
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activity, the anti-discrimination statute recognizes two categories of
71
This distinction is important
activity: participation and opposition.
due to the different levels of protection given to each activity.72
1. Participation
Courts broadly define participation to mean all activity surrounding
the filing of a Title VII charge with the EEOC or the filing of a lawsuit
under Title VII.73 Once a person files a charge or initiates a lawsuit, the
anti-retaliation statute protects their participation throughout the
74
litigation. The participant need not win on the merits of the underlying
charge in order to have a retaliation claim against her employer.75 For
example, an employee who files a charge of harassment against her boss
will still be deemed to have been participating in the charging process
regardless of whether the charge of harassment is proven true.76
“Although the participation clause may be nearly absolute in
77
Once a participant
theory, it may seldom be absolute in fact.”
establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden then shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for taking

Id. § 15. After such a showing, the plaintiff must then show that the proffered reason either did not
actually motivate the employer or was insufficient motivation to take the alleged retaliatory action.
Id. If the employer did not know that the employee exercised a protected right, it would logically
follow that the employer could not have retaliated against the employee. Id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
72. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 720. “The distinction between employee activities protected by
the participation clause and those protected by the opposition clause is significant because federal
courts have generally granted less protection for opposition than for participation in enforcement
proceedings.” Id. (quoting Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th
Cir. 1989)).
73. Id. The protection provided under the participation clause is exceptionally broad and
extends to persons who have participated in any manner in Title VII proceedings. Id. (citing
Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000)). “[O]nce the activity in question
is found to be within the scope of the participation clause, the employee is generally protected from
retaliation.” Id. at 720-21 (quoting Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312 (6th Cir. 1989)).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
75. See Pasantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Products Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir.
2000) (finding that the Participation Clause even protects charges made in bad faith). See also
Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759 (2d Cir. 1998). Even when it is determined that no
sexual harassment has occurred, an employee is still protected from retaliation for alleging that it
occurred. Id.
76. Chamberlin, supra note 70, § 5 (“Apart from evidence of actually filing a charge of
discrimination, the plaintiff may be able to show sufficient participation in Title VII proceedings by
evidence of attendance at an investigative hearing, providing testimony by deposition or affidavit, or
by assisting a fellow employee in bringing a discrimination charge.”).
77. 5 Emp. Coord. Employment Practices § 10:18.
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the adverse employment action.78 If the employer meets this burden, the
employee must then show that the proffered non-discriminatory reason
79
was pre-textual. The employee must show that the stated reason was
not based in fact, did not actually motivate the employer to take the
adverse employment action, or did not provide sufficient motivation for
the employer.80
2. Opposition
The opposition clause covers a wide variety of behavior by
employees not protected by the participation clause.81 The goal of the
opposition clause is to allow employees to express any concerns
regarding discrimination, and allow employers to address those concerns
without turning to litigation.82 In contrast to participation, opposition
activity must be reasonable in order to receive protection under the antiretaliation statute.83 Courts have employed a balancing test to determine
84
whether the opposition conduct is reasonable,. The purpose of this test
is to balance the employer’s need to maintain an orderly workplace with
the employee’s rights under Title VII.85 The employee must have a

78. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
79. Id.; see also Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2009).
80. See infra notes 172-92 and accompanying text for an expanded discussion of pretext.
81. Chamberlin, supra note 70, § 6. Examples of opposition activity include: threatening to
file a charge of discrimination, complaining about alleged discrimination on behalf of yourself or
others, nonverbal protests against discrimination, or refusing to obey an order because one
reasonably believes that it is discriminatory. EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 70, Section 8II(B)(2).
82. Chamberlin, supra note 70, § 6.
83. Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 721 (2008) (citing Johnson v. Univ. of
Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 580 (6th Cir. 2000)).
84. Id. at 725; see also EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 70, Section 8-II(B)(3)(a) (“The
manner in which an individual protests perceived employment discrimination must be reasonable in
order for the anti- retaliation provisions to apply. In applying a “reasonableness” standard, courts
and the Commission balance the right of individuals to oppose employment discrimination and the
public's interest in enforcement of the EEO laws against an employer's need for a stable and
productive work environment.”).
85. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 722. (“A balance must be achieved between the employer's
recognized, legitimate need to maintain an orderly workplace and to protect confidential business
and client information, and the equally compelling need of employees to be properly safeguarded
against retaliatory actions. Allowing too much protection to employees for disclosing confidential
information may perversely incentivize behavior that ought not be tolerated in the workplace—
namely, the surreptitious theft of confidential documents as potential future ammunition should the
employee eventually feel wronged by her employer. On the other hand, inadequate protection to
employees might provide employers with a legally sanctioned reason to terminate an employee in
retaliation for engaging in activity that Title VII and related statutes are designed to protect.”).
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reasonable and good-faith belief that the opposed practice is unlawful.86
The primary difference between participation and opposition is that
participation activity typically involves a charge or a lawsuit being
filed,87 while opposition activity typically covers conduct prior to the
88
That seemingly trivial distinction
filing of a charge or a lawsuit.
matters greatly in the amount of protection each activity is afforded.89
B.

Administrative Law

Through Title VII, Congress created a regulatory body to oversee
its implementation—the EEOC.90 While the primary source of guidance
in Title VII cases is the statutory text,91 courts give deference to the
EEOC compliance manual in cases where the statute is unclear.92
The EEOC manual states that participation “applies to individuals
challenging employment discrimination under the statutes enforced by
EEOC . . . and to individuals who testify or otherwise participate in such
93
proceedings.” The manual asks one question to determine whether a
person is participating: “Did the [complaining party] or someone closely
associated with [her] file a charge, or testify, assist, or participate in any

86. Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass’n Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that an
employee need not prove that the opposed conduct is actually unlawful, but must have a reasonable
good-faith belief that the conduct is unlawful).
87. EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 70, Section 8-II(C)(2) (“While the opposition
clause applies only to those who protest practices that they reasonably and in good faith believe are
unlawful, the participation clause applies to all individuals who participate in the statutory
complaint process.”).
88. Id. at Section 8-II(B)(2).
89. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
90. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-4.
91. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002). “In the absence of
an indication to the contrary, words in a statute are assumed to bear their ‘ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning.’” Id. (quoting Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207
(1997)).
92. Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008).
The Federal Government interacts with individual citizens through all but countless
forms, schedules, manuals, and worksheets. Congress, in most cases, delegates the
format and design of these instruments to the agencies that administer the relevant laws
and processes. An assumption underlying the congressional decision to delegate
rulemaking and enforcement authority to the agency, and the consequent judicial rule of
deference to the agency's determinations, is that the agency will take all efforts to ensure
that affected parties will receive the full benefits and protections of the law.
Id. at 406-07.
93. EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 70, Section 8-II(C)(1). The manual further
defines the types of activities associated with participation: “Protection under the participation
clause extends to those who file untimely charges. In the federal sector, once a federal employee
initiates contact with an EEO counselor, (s)he is engaging in “participation.” Id.
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manner in an investigation, proceeding, hearing, or lawsuit under the
94
statutes enforced by the EEOC?” If the answer to that question is yes,
the employee is protected against retaliation by her employer.95 Per the
EEOC, “[t]he anti-discrimination statutes do not limit or condition in
any way the protection against retaliation for participating in the charge
process.”96
IV. ANALYSIS
The position that Niswander argued in her brief to the Sixth Circuit
is the position taken in this note: in determining whether a Title VII
litigant is participating in a protected activity, the relevance of any
documents she produces is irrelevant when she is responding to a formal
request for production.97 What is important is whether she objectively
responded to the formal production request in good faith.98 The
relevance of the documents provided should not matter to what is
99
objectively an act of participation. The question of whether Niswander
acted in good faith should have been presented to a jury.100
This argument does not suggest that an employee should be
immunized from adverse employment actions when disclosing
confidential documents in discovery.101 Instead, to balance the concern
of protecting the employer’s maintenance of confidentiality with the
employee’s right to participate in Title VII proceedings, the court should
focus on the pretext analysis of the employer’s stated reason for
terminating the employee.102 Where an employer is legitimately and
sufficiently motivated to take an adverse employment action against an
employee for her disclosure of confidential documents, that employee
can be legally terminated from her employment.103

94. Id. at Section 8-I(B).
95. Id.
96. Id. at Section 8-II(C)(2).
97. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 17.
98. See infra notes 118-60 and accompanying text. A good faith standard was not argued by
Niswander, but instead is an argument proposed by this note. See Final Brief for Appellant, supra
note 17.
99. See infra notes 118-60 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 118-60 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 172-92 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 172-92 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 172-92 and accompanying text.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

15

Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 6

11_LEDGER_WESTERN 2.18.11.DOCM

598

A.

2/22/2011 2:20 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:583

Congressional Intent

The Sixth Circuit held that production of confidential documents in
response to a formal discovery request does not constitute participation
in a protected activity unless the produced documents are relevant.104
The holding unfairly requires a lay participant in a Title VII action to
make a legal determination as to the relevance of any documents she
turns over.105 The decision makes no exception for the fact that
Niswander reasonably believed she was responding in good faith to
CIC’s broad request for discovery.106 The fact that Niswander did not
believe the documents were directly related to the equal pay claim was
107
fatal to her claim that she was participating in a protected activity.
By interjecting a relevance test into the production of documents in
discovery, the Sixth Circuit has provided employers with the discretion
to fire an employee based on the quality of the employee’s
participation.108 Congress did not intend for such a restriction when
109
drafting the anti-retaliation provision.
In drafting Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, Congress intended
to provide exceptionally broad protection.110 The statutory language

104. Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 722 (6th Cir. 2008). “An individual's
delivery of relevant documents during the discovery process or the giving of testimony at a
deposition clearly falls within the ambit of participating ‘in any manner’ in a Title VII proceeding.”
Id. (citing Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997)).
105. Id.; see infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text. Although one may argue that
Niswander’s attorneys could have determined whether the documents were relevant, CIC’s alleged
reason for firing Niswander was that she produced the confidential documents to a third-party
(Niswander’s attorneys) for a non-business purpose. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 728. In CIC’s view, it
was up to Niswander to determine what documents were legally relevant to the request for
production without assistance of counsel. Id.
106. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 14.
107. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 721. Niswander admitted that she had no documents to support an
equal pay claim. Id. “This admission is fatal to her argument that her conduct should be deemed
participation(.)” Id.
108. Id. at 722. Justice McKeague suggests in his concurring opinion that an employee must
always preserve evidence in a way that will not violate the employer’s confidentiality policy.
Niswander, 529 F.3d at 729 (McKeague, J., concurring).
109. See infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
110. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 (5th Cir. 1969). (“The
protective provisions of Title VII are substantially broader than even those included in the Fair
Labor Standards Act and the National Labor Relations Act in that, in addition to protecting charges
and testimony, Title VII also specifically protects assistance and participation. This indicates the
exceptionally broad protection intended for protestors of discriminatory employment practices. The
protection of assistance and participation in any manner would be illusory if employer could
retaliate against employee for having assisted or participated in a Commission proceeding.”); see
also EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 70, Section 8-II(D)(3) (“The anti-retaliation provisions
are exceptionally broad.”).
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protects anyone who has testified or participated “in any manner.”111
112
This wording has been broadly interpreted:
The anti-retaliation provision is straightforward and expansively
written. Congress chose the language “testified” and “participated in
any manner” to express its intent about the activity to be protected
against retaliation. The word “testified” is not preceded or followed by
any restrictive language that limits its reach. As to “participated in any
manner”, the adjective “any” is not ambiguous; it has a wellestablished meaning. Earlier this year, the Supreme Court explained,
“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is,
‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ ” . . . “Congress did
not add any language limiting the breadth of that word,” so “any”
113
means all.

Had Congress desired, it may have protected participation “in any
relevant manner”; the fact that Congress chose not to evidences its desire
114
Where
for broad sweeping protection against employer retaliation.
statutory language is clear and the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent, the court typically does not need to conduct an in-depth
analysis.115
Title VII’s anti-retaliation statute specifically protects participation
“in any manner” and in no way limits participation on the basis of
relevance.116 The better standard to judge participation is not relevance,
but good faith.117
B.

Good Faith Analysis

When it comes to the production of confidential documents in Title
VII discovery, plaintiffs should receive protection from employer

111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
112. See Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that the explicit language
of the participation clause is expansive and seemingly contains no limitations); see also Clover v.
Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the words “participate in
any manner” indicate broad Congressional intent).
113. Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States
v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (internal citations omitted)).
114. Glover v. South Carolina Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999).
“Congress could not have carved out in clearer terms this safe harbor from employer retaliation.”
Id. The Fourth Circuit found the statutory language so clear that it forecloses the improvisation of
any further requirement. Id.
115. U.S. v. Wildes, 120 F.3d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1
(1997)); see also Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
117. See infra notes 118-60 and accompanying text.
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retaliation as long as they are responding to the production request in
118
First, a Title VII participant may not know the legal
good faith.
relevance of the documents she is producing; however, she knows
whether she is acting in good faith.119 Second, a good faith standard
will alleviate one primary concern of the Sixth Circuit:
the
immunization of bad faith conduct. On the other hand, a relevance
standard may actually uphold the future production of documents in bad
120
faith.
1. Good Faith v. Relevance
The purpose of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is to give a lay
person unfettered access to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms.121 A lay
person cannot be expected to know whether a document is legally
122
relevant, thus, it is unfair to impose such a standard on a Title VII
plaintiff.123
For example, Niswander allegedly violated CIC’s
confidentiality policy because she turned irrelevant documents over to
124
Thus, CIC implicitly required that Niswander know
her attorneys.
what documents were legally relevant to the production request before
125
The relevance of documents is a
she disclosed them to her attorneys.

118. Id.
119. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that a party may obtain discovery
regarding “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Relevant
information does not need to be admissible, as long as the discovery request is “reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Meanwhile,
good faith is defined as “A state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2)
faithfulness to one's duty or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable
advantage.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
120. See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
121. EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 124 (1988). The ADEA, like
Title VII, sets up a “remedial scheme in which laypersons, rather than lawyers, are expected to
initiate the process.” Id. “The system must be accessible to individuals who have no detailed
knowledge of the relevant statutory mechanisms and agency processes.” Federal Exp. Corp. v.
Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 403 (2008).
122. Id. It is important to note that Niswander was a claims adjuster with CIC. Thus, the
argument could have been made in her case that she might have known the legal relevance of the
documents. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 43, at *5-6. Despite this fact, the goal of case
law is to establish the law for the cases to come and not necessarily the cases at hand. Glover, 170
F.3d at 415. The vast majority of Title VII litigants are lay people, not lawyers. Commercial Office
Products Co., 486 U.S. at 124.
123. Id.; see supra note 121 and accompanying text.
124. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 728.
125. Id. One reason Niswander claimed that CIC’s proffered non-discriminatory reason for
terminating her was pretext is that CIC made no attempt to mitigate the alleged damage done by
Niswander’s disclosure. Id. One of CIC’s arguments to counter that was that “the horse was out of
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point that trained attorneys argue to a nuance in thousands of courtrooms
126
The effect of requiring a lay Title VII participant to
every year.
understand what is legally relevant to her case without the help of her
attorney does not fit within the overarching goal of the anti-retaliation
statute—to allow unfettered access to Title VII’s remedial
mechanisms.127 The better standard would be to allow the participant to
produce the documents to her attorney so long as she is acting in good
128
faith.
The Sixth Circuit’s primary reason for adopting the relevance
requirement was that to do otherwise would insulate employees who
engage in bad faith conduct.129 While this is certainly a valid concern,
the Sixth Circuit’s remedy of adopting a relevance test on the production
of confidential documents does not fully address that concern.130 If the
documents that Niswander produced had been relevant to the discovery
request under the Niswander decision, Niswander would have been
considered “participating.” Thus, the Sixth Circuit would have granted
131
despite the fact that the Sixth Circuit had
her “participant” status
described her conduct as “the surreptitious theft of confidential
documents as potential future ammunition(.)”132 The Sixth Circuit
expressed disdain for Niswander’s conduct, while simultaneously
establishing a rule that may, in future cases, immunize such conduct so
long as the produced documents are relevant.133

the barn.” Id. In essence, CIC was arguing that once Niswander turned the documents over to her
attorneys, she violated CIC’s confidentiality policy and there was nothing they could have done to
correct the disclosure. Id.
126. As of March 9, 2010, Westlaw’s Keycite reports that there were 8195 cases that have
cited to Federal Rule of Evidence 401 within the past year alone.
127. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 129-60 and accompanying text.
129. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 722.
130. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
131. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 722. “An individual's delivery of relevant documents during the
discovery process or the giving of testimony at a deposition clearly falls within the ambit of
participating ‘in any manner’ in a Title VII proceeding.” Id.
132. Id. Niswander lost the battle of characterization on this point given the fact that
Niswander worked from home; she looked through the documents that she had in her home office.
From the documents she had at home, Niswander produced several irrelevant and confidential
documents that she believed supported a claim of retaliation. Id. at 717-19.
133. Id. at 722.
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2. Good Faith Precedent
In order to rid bad faith conduct from Title VII litigation, the better
standard to apply is good faith.134 Title VII already imposes a good faith
135
An employee who opposes conduct
standard on opposition activity.
that is not actually prohibited by Title VII is still protected under the
opposition clause if she has a good faith belief that the opposed conduct
was prohibited.136 Some courts have even imposed good faith
requirements on participation activity.137
In Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., an employee, Mattson, filed a
sexual discrimination complaint against his supervisor, alleging that the
supervisor had rubbed her breasts against his arm during a
conversation.138 Mattson had testified in a prior investigation that he did
not believe the touch to be intentional and that he did not believe that his
139
Furthermore, a co-worker filed an
boss was sexually attracted to him.
affidavit concerning a conversation that occurred with Mattson in which
Mattson stated that he had filed the complaint as a means to get his boss
fired in “any way possible.”140 The Seventh Circuit found, as a matter
of law, that Mattson had filed the complaint in bad faith.141 Despite the
fact that the filing of a complaint is objectively an act of participation,
the court held that an utterly baseless claim filed with malice cannot
receive the protection afforded by the participation clause:142
We believe that the same threshold standard should apply to both
opposition and participation clause cases. That is, the claims must not
be utterly baseless. Were we to adopt a different standard, an employee
134. See infra notes 134-59 and accompanying text.
135. Brannum v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 518 F.3d 542, 547 (8th Cir 2008).
136. Id.
137. Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th Cir. 2004); see also, Belt v. Alabama
Historical Com’n, No. Civ.A. 04-0331-WSM, 2005 WL 1653728, at *9 (S.D.Ala. July 12, 2005).
In Belt, the District Court commented that a good faith standard should be applied to both
opposition and participation conduct and that the Plaintiff met a good faith standard in her conduct
during a deposition. However, the Plaintiff still could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation
because she did not suffer an adverse employment action. Id. at *9-11.
138. Mattson, 359 F.3d at 887-88.
139. Id. at 888.
140. Id. at 889.
141. Id. “[T]he sexual harassment charge Mattson filed with the IDHR and EEOC was both
objectively and subjectively unreasonable, as well as made with the bad faith purpose of retaliating
against his female supervisor.” Id.
142. Id. at 892. (“[T]he unique circumstances of this case present us with a complaint that is
not only unreasonable and meritless, but also motivated by bad faith. Against this factual backdrop,
we find that Mattson's claim is not deserving of protection under the participation clause of Title
VII. The paucity of case law on point illustrates the rarity of such claims as well as the limited
nature of our holding.”).
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could immunize his unreasonable and malicious internal complaints
simply by filing a discrimination complaint with a government agency.
Similarly, an employee could assure himself unlimited tenure by filing
continuous complaints with the government agency if he fears that his
143
employer will discover his duplicitous behavior at the workplace.

While ruling that a good faith standard should apply to participation
activity, the court noted that the scope of its ruling would affect few
Title VII cases given the relatively small amount of cases in which bad
faith claims are presented.144
In Mattson, the court examined what was objectively an act of
participation, but articulated specific facts that showed that the
participant was acting in bad faith.145 Applying a good faith standard to
Niswander, the Sixth Circuit could have examined what motive
Niswander had in producing the confidential documents.146 If the court
could determine as a matter of law that Niswander acted in bad faith, the
court could have declined to extend protection under the participation
clause.147 Applying such an analysis would have alleviated one of the
court’s primary concerns–immunizing future bad faith conduct of
148
employees.
An example of bad faith conduct is the case of O’Day v. McDonnell
149
Dealing with an act of opposition, O’Day is
Douglas Helicopter Co.
a quintessential example of bad faith conduct in Title VII.150 In that
case, O’Day’s employer denied O’Day a promotion and O’Day believed
151
That same night, O’Day broke into his
that it was because of his age.
supervisor’s office, rummaged through his supervisor’s private files,

143. Id. at 891.
144. Id. at 892.
145. Id.
146. Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 727 (6th Cir. 2008). The court does
briefly talk about Niswander’s motive in searching for these documents: “Niswander specifically
searched through the CIC documents that she had at her home office for the purpose of uncovering
evidence of retaliation. Such behavior cannot be classified as truly innocent acquisition.” Id.
147. Niswander likely would have survived a good faith analysis because she testified at her
deposition that she provided the documents in response to the request for production because she
believed that CIC wanted documents related to retaliation as well as equal pay. Reply Brief of
Appellant at 4, Niswander, 529 F.3d 714 (No. 07-3738). Although Niswander provided irrelevant
confidential information, unlike Mattson, there were no facts from which the court could infer
malice. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 722.
148. Id.
149. 79 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1996).
150. Id. O’Day is also the primary example that the Sixth Circuit compared Niswander’s
behavior to in its opposition clause analysis. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 723.
151. O’Day, 79 F.3d at 758.
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copied certain documents, and showed them to fellow employees.152
Even if O’Day had filed suit prior to searching his supervisor’s office,
the court should not protect this type of bad faith conduct because it is
not inherently a part of litigation.153
One could argue that Congress’s desire for broad sweeping
protection under the participation clause should include bad faith
conduct.154 Indeed, there is case law supporting this proposition.155
Examples of bad faith conduct that were deemed protected include filing
156
an unfounded charge,157 or even a malicious
a meritless charge,
charge.158 Mattson represents a break from this view.159 However, for
the same reasons that Mattson decided that an utterly baseless charge
filed in bad faith was undeserving of participation clause protection, a
court may decline protection to an employee’s acquiring and
160
disseminating of confidential documents in bad faith.
152. Id.
153. The court may actually sanction parties in Title VII under its inherent power to sanction
where “the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 US 240, 258–59 (1975). One bad faith
sanction in Title VII is attorney’s fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k). That subsection states:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs, and the Commission and the
United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
Id.
154. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
155. See id.
156. EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), opinion
supplemented, 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1977); Hearth v.
Metropolitan Transit Commission (M. T. C.), 436 F. Supp. 685 (D. Minn. 1977); EEOC Decision
No. 71-1115, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 273 (E.E.O.C. 1971).
157. Bradington v. Int’l Business Machines Corp., 360 F. Supp. 845 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd, 492
F.2d 1240 (4th Cir. 1974); EEOC Decision No. 71-1545, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 761
(E.E.O.C. 1971).
158. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969).
159. See supra notes 145-60 and accompanying text.
160. Compare Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that a
good faith standard applies to both the opposition and participation clauses), with O’Day v.
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 1996) (declining opposition clause
protection to an employee’s bad faith conduct). In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., the
United States Supreme Court left open the possibility of applying the bad-faith doctrine of unclean
hands to Title VII claims. 513 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1995). Though procedurally distinct, McKennon
is factually similar to Niswander. Id. at 354-55. McKennon dealt with an employee who suspected
that her employer was planning to fire her due to her age. Id. She subsequently copied several
confidential documents in preparation for potential litigation. Id. McKennon’s bad faith conduct
ultimately limited her recovery. Id. at 362-63. Procedurally, McKennon involved the after-acquired
evidence doctrine. Id. at 360-61. The after-acquired evidence doctrine is used when an employer
discovers evidence of employee wrongdoing that would have given the employer independent
grounds to terminate the employee. Id. The doctrine is not a pure defense to an employee’s claim
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Protecting Employer Confidentiality

Another concern of the Sixth Circuit was that the documents at
issue were confidential, thus, higher standards were needed to protect
against unauthorized dissemination.161 However, unauthorized
dissemination should not have been a significant issue in Niswander
because the documents were produced as part of a formal discovery
request.162 The documents were given to officers of the court
(Niswander’s attorneys) who were bound by a protective order not to use
any confidential documents exchanged in discovery for any improper
purpose.163
One aspect of modern litigation is the advent of protective orders in
guarding corporate confidentiality.164 The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure specifically state that a court may require “that a trade secret
or other confidential research, development, or commercial information
not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way.”165 The Sixth
Circuit held that Niswander could have preserved the documents without
166
However, the court scarcely
producing them to her attorneys.
commented on whether the production of the documents caused actual
167
The court never commented on the fact that there was a
damage.

of retaliation. However, once the employer discovers the independent grounds for termination the
employee’s damages for lost wages ceases to accumulate further. Id.
161. Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 722 (6th Cir. 2008). “Allowing too much
protection to employees for disclosing confidential information may perversely incentivize behavior
that ought not be tolerated in the workplace-namely, the surreptitious theft of confidential
documents as potential future ammunition should the employee eventually feel wronged by her
employer.” Id.
162. One problem for Niswander is that she lost the battle of characterization on this argument.
Id. at 726. The Sixth Circuit refused to examine Niswander’s conduct as part of a formal discovery
request because the documents produced were non-responsive. Id. The court analyzed Niswander’s
production as if it had occurred outside the formal discovery structure of the court. Id.
163. Id. at 727. In analyzing the opposition clause, the Sixth Circuit found that Niswander
providing the documents to her attorneys was not as problematic as disclosing them to a co-worker.
However, the court felt that there were better means available for Niswander to preserve the
documents. Thus, her production was not reasonable. Id.
164. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G).
165. Id.
166. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 727. “Niswander's providing the documents to her Rochlin
attorneys is less problematic than giving them to a fellow employee. But in light of the fact that
Niswander had alternative means to inform her Rochlin counsel of the alleged retaliation, her
behavior cannot be condoned simply because she limited the dissemination of the documents in
question to her attorneys.” Id.
167. The court had already ruled that Niswander could not establish a prima facie claim of
retaliation by the time it discussed Niswander’s pretext argument, thus, the court did not
significantly analyze this point. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 728. However, Niswander argued heavily
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protective order, which allowed the parties to exchange confidential
168
information.
Protective orders are, obviously, an ever-expanding feature of
modern litigation
. . . Protective orders recognize that parties engaged in litigation do not
sacrifice all aspects of privacy or their proprietary information simply
because of a lawsuit. But there remains a concomitant principle
favoring full, fair, and open disclosure of the important matters
169
occurring in the public's courts.

If genuine damage had been done to CIC or its clients by
Niswander’s production of confidential documents, CIC could have
placed the documents under the protective order of the court or
otherwise availed itself of the protection that the court may afford to
discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). CIC’s failure to take steps to
protect the confidential documents gives rise to Niswander’s argument
that CIC was not sufficiently motivated by the document disclosure to
terminate Niswander.170 In other words, CIC’s stated reason was
171
pretext.
The protective order is just one way the court can protect an
employer’s interest in confidentiality.172 Another way to balance the
interests of the employer’s confidentiality with the protection provided

in her brief that the alleged damage from the dissemination of documents was minimal. Final Brief
for Appellant, supra note 17, at 28-30.
168. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 8. The protective order stated that “[e]ither
party, may at the time of production, designate such information as ‘confidential’ and the
information so designated shall thereafter be subject to the provisions of this order.” Id.
169. In re Mirapex Products Liability Litigation, 246 F.R.D. 668, 672-73 (D. Minn. 2007).
170. An interesting fact not briefed to the Sixth Circuit is that Niswander was not the first
person to be terminated for producing confidential documents in the context of the equal pay case.
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment as to Claims Brought by
Plaintiff Mary Slover, Rochlin v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. IP001898C H/K, 2005 WL 1025776 (S.D.
Ind. Apr. 7, 2005). Def's. Memorandum in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., Rochlin v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 2005 WL 1025776 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 7, 2005) (No. 01-01898). In September 2005,
approximately three months before CIC terminated Niswander, another equal pay litigant was fired
for producing confidential documents in response to a formal request for production. Id. “On
September 26, 2005, [CIC] terminated Slover's employment because Slover was providing
confidential and proprietary information directly to her counsel without CIC's knowledge or
permission in violation of CIC's policies.” Id. A third equal pay participant was also fired for the
same reason as Niswander. See Niswander v. Price, Waicukauski & Riley, LLC, No.
1:2008cv01325 (S.D. Ind. filed Oct. 2, 2008).
171. See infra notes 172-92 and accompanying text.
172. In re Mirapex, 246 F.R.D. at 672.
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by the anti-retaliation provision is for courts to evaluate the production
173
of confidential documents under a pretext analysis.
Since the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, Title VII retaliation cases have employed a
burden-shifting mechanism.174 Once an employee establishes her prima
facie case of retaliation, the burden is then shifted to the employer to
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for taking the adverse
employment action.175 To establish a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason, the employer must point to particular facts upon which it
reasonably relied on in making its decision to terminate the employee.176
The employer must also express why it was reasonable for the employer
177
After the employer articulates its reason,
to rely on the stated facts.
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s
178
An employee may show pretext in one of
stated reason was pretext.
the following three ways: 1) the stated reason has no actual basis in fact;
2) the stated reason did not actually motivate the employer to take the
adverse employment action; or 3) the stated reason did not sufficiently
motivate the employer to take the adverse employment action.179
CIC’s proffered reason for firing Niswander was that she violated
the company’s code of conduct by producing confidential documents to

173. See infra notes 174-92 and accompanying text.
174. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
175. Id. at 802.
176. Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 2006). Under the “honest
belief” doctrine, adopted in some circuits, an employee cannot show pretext if the employer
honestly believed that the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was a basis for firing the employee.
Id. The Sixth Circuit has adopted a modified doctrine that requires the employer to state the
particular facts upon which it believed and why its belief was reasonable in taking the adverse
employment action. Id. (citing Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998)).
177. Id.
In determining whether an employer reasonably relied on the particularized facts then
before it, we do not require that the decisional process used by the employer be optimal
or that it left no stone unturned. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the employer made a
reasonably informed and considered decision before taking an adverse employment
action. Although we will not micro-manage the process used by employers in making
their employment decisions, we also will not blindly assume that an employer's
description of its reasons is honest. Therefore, when the employee is able to produce
sufficient evidence to establish that the employer failed to make a reasonably informed
and considered decision before taking its adverse employment action, thereby making its
decisional process unworthy of credence, then any reliance placed by the employer in
such a process cannot be said to be honestly held.
Id. at 708 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
178. Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998).
179. Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 592 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Dews v.
A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir. 2000)).
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a third-party for purposes other than company business.180 Niswander
responded to this argument by first alleging that CIC’s proffered reason
had no basis in fact because Niswander produced documents in response
to CIC’s request and, thus, CIC authorized the release.181 Niswander
also argued that CIC was not sufficiently motivated to terminate her
based on the fact that CIC took no action to remedy the alleged
violation.182 CIC did not protect the documents by placing them under
183
CIC’s attorney in charge of privacy did
the court’s protective order.
not conduct an investigation concerning the alleged violation, did not
contact any of the customers whose alleged privacy was violated, and
did not even look at the documents which were produced.184
Having already declared Niswander’s conduct insufficient to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the Sixth Circuit briefly
analyzed Niswander’s pretext argument and determined that Niswander
could not show that CIC’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason was
pretext.185 What is important in their discussion of pretext is that the
Sixth Circuit could have protected CIC’s interest in maintaining the
confidential documents by accepting CIC’s proffered nondiscriminatory
reason for terminating Niswander.186 The court noted that CIC’s
proffered reason had a basis in fact because Niswander was not
technically responding to the production request when she produced
confidential documents.187 The court went on to comment that CIC was
actually motivated by Niswander’s violation of company policy and that
180. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 43, at 34.
181. The provision in CIC’s Code of Conduct which Niswander relied on states: “Associates,
officers and directors may not transmit confidential information to any other person, internal or
external, except when disclosure is legally mandated, authorized by the company or required for the
proper conduct of business.” Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 26.
182. Id. at 28-30. The insufficient motivation argument is best characterized in the following
passage: “We have held that when an employer . . . waits for a legal, legitimate reason to
fortuitously materialize, and then uses it to cover up his true, longstanding motivations for firing the
employee, the employer's actions constitute the very definition of pretext.” Hamilton v. General
Elec. Co., 556 F.3d 428, 436 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Jones v. Potter, 488 F.3d 397, 408 (6th Cir
2007) (internal quotations omitted)).
183. Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at *28.
184. Id. at *31.
185. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 728. Whether the court properly analyzed Niswander’s pretext
claim is beyond the scope of this note. However, the Sixth Circuit failed to analyze the third prong
of pretext. Id. The Court properly analyzed whether CIC’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason had
a basis in fact and whether the document production actually motivated CIC’s decision to terminate
Niswander. But, the Court never analyzed the primary argument Niswander made in regards to
pretext—whether Niswander’s conduct sufficiently motivated CIC. Id.; see also, Final Brief for
Appellant, supra note 17, at *28-30.
186. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 728.
187. Id.
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Niswander failed to present evidence to the contrary.188 By analyzing
this case as an issue of pretext, the Sixth Circuit could have accepted
Niswander’s production as participation for the purposes of establishing
a prima facie retaliation claim, while also accepting CIC’s legitimate
189
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Niswander.
An employer has a legitimate interest in protecting the
confidentiality of its documents.190 Focusing on whether that interest
actually or sufficiently motivates the employer to fire an employee for
disseminating such documents could sufficiently protect both the
employer’s interest in maintaining confidentiality as well as the
191
The Sixth
employee’s right to participate in Title VII proceedings.
Circuit could have addressed its concern over protecting employer
confidentiality by analyzing employee conduct within the framework of
pretext.192
D.

Analysis of Other Circuits

In Glover v. South Carolina Law Enforcement Div., the Fourth
Circuit extended protection under the participation clause to wholly
193
Glover dealt with a deponent who
irrelevant deposition testimony.
discussed matters concerning her boss outside the scope of the
underlying Title VII claim upon which she was called to testify.194
Although Glover discussed irrelevant matters during her deposition, the
Fourth Circuit held that Glover was protected under the participation
clause because the relevance of her statements did not change the fact
that she was participating in a deposition. Participating in a deposition

188. Id.
189. Id. at 727-28 (holding that summary judgment was proper even if Niswander could have
established a prima facie case of retaliation).
190. Id. at 726 (quoting Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1036
(5th Cir. 1980)). An employer has a “legitimate and substantial interest in keeping its personnel
records and agency documents confidential.” Id.
191. See supra notes 173-90 and accompanying text.
192. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 728. The Sixth Circuit found that Niswander’s conduct in
violating CIC’s confidentiality gave CIC a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to terminate
Niswander. Id. at 727-28.
193. 170 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 528 U.S. 1146 (2000).
194. Id. at 412. (“Glover freely offered not only facts directly related to [her supervisor’s]
problems with the South Dakota marshals’ office, but also her impressions of the operations of the
South Carolina marshals’ office. In particular, Glover perorated upon the perceived failings of her
successor as the South Carolina U.S. Marshal, Israel Brooks. During the course of her testimony
Glover accused Brooks of mismanagement, destruction of office documents, wasting funds,
inappropriate behavior, dishonesty, and discrimination.”).
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was clearly an act of participation.195 The application of Title VII’s
participation clause does not depend on the substance of the
196
“A straightforward reading of the statute's unrestrictive
participation.
language leads inexorably to the conclusion that all testimony in a Title
197
VII proceeding is protected against punitive employer action.”
Similar to CIC’s argument in Niswander, the South Carolina Law
Enforcement Division (“SLED”) argued that because Glover’s testimony
was irrelevant to her Title VII claim, her behavior was unreasonable and
thus should not constitute participation.198 Even assuming that Glover’s
testimony was irrelevant, the Fourth Circuit still rejected SLED’s
argument by refusing to separate the relevance of a person’s testimony at
a deposition from the objective act of testifying.199 In responding to
SLED’s proposed reasonableness standard, the court declared that:
Reading a reasonableness test into section 704(a)'s participation clause
would do violence to the text of that provision and would undermine
200
the objectives of Title VII
. . . Congress has determined that some
irrelevant and even provocative testimony must be immunized so that
201
Title VII proceedings will not be chilled.

In Niswander, however, the Sixth Circuit suggested that a
reasonableness test can be applied to participation.202 The court held
that “[t]he analysis of a participation claim does not generally require a
finding of reasonableness . . . [b]ut when confidential information is at

195. Id. at 413.
196. Id. at 414.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 413. The arguments presented by CIC in Niswander and SLED in Glover are
strikingly similar. Compare Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714 (6th Cir. 2008)
(arguing that irrelevant document production should not constitute participation), with Glover, 170
F.3d 411 (arguing that irrelevant deposition testimony should not constitute participation). In both
cases the Title VII claimant’s participation was clearly irrelevant to the Title VII litigation. Id. In
both cases the Defendants argued that irrelevant participation must meet a reasonableness test. Id.
199. Id. at 415.
The plain language of the participation clause itself forecloses us from improvising such
a reasonableness test. The clause forbids retaliation against an employee who “has made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner” in a protected proceeding.
Glover was fired because she “testified” in a Title VII deposition. The term “testify” has
a plain meaning: “[t]o bear witness” or “to give evidence as a witness.”
Id. at 414 (internal citations omitted).
200. Id. at 414.
201. Id.
202. Niswander, 529 F.3d at 726. Because the court had already declared that Niswander’s
actions did not constitute participation, its holding that a reasonableness test could be applied to
participation was in dicta. Id.
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issue, a reasonableness requirement is appropriate.”203 The Sixth
Circuit’s holding in Niswander is similar to that of the dissent in
204
Like the Sixth Circuit, Judge Williams’ dissent was primarily
Glover.
concerned with the negative effects of immunizing bad-faith conduct of
205
In
employees. Thus, he felt a reasonableness test was appropriate.
the majority opinion of Glover, Chief Judge Wilkinson responds to the
dissent by stating:
Our good colleague in dissent fails to address the broad wording of the
statute. Instead, the dissent subscribes to a nebulous rule of reason
which, while it may seem clear in this case, will be anything but clear
in the long line of cases to come. The statute permits an employee to
be discharged for a wide variety of deficiencies in performance, but it
does not subject an employee's testimony in a Title VII suit to the
206
uncertain limbo of an employer's perception of its reasonableness.

That same reasoning should apply to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Niswander— a broad request for production implicates broad relevance.
“The anti-discrimination statutes do not limit or condition in any
way the protection against retaliation for participating in the charge
process.”207 The plain language of the anti-retaliation statute does not
208
Interjecting a relevance requirement into the
contain limiting words.
participation clause is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and
opens the door to uncertainty.209 An employer should not have the right
to discharge an employee who is objectively participating in a Title VII
210
lawsuit based on the relevance of her participation.

203. Id.
204. Compare Niswander, 529 F.3d at 726 (finding a reasonableness test appropriate), with
Glover, 170 F.3d at 416 (Williams, J., dissenting) (arguing that irrelevant deposition testimony
should be analyzed under a reasonableness standard).
205. In dissent, Judge Williams states: “Congress surely did not intend to give asylum to
employees to gratuitously disparage and maliciously accuse their peers of professional misconduct
having nothing whatsoever to do with the underlying charge of discrimination, simply because the
comments were made during a deposition in a Title VII proceeding.” Glover, 170 F.3d at 416.
Compare that with the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Niswander: “[C]oncluding that Niswander's
conduct here is protected participation . . . would provide employees with near-immunity for their
actions in connection with antidiscrimination lawsuits, protecting them from disciplinary action
even when they knowingly provide irrelevant, confidential information . . . .” Niswander, 529 F.3d
at 722.
206. Glover, 170 F.3d at 415.
207. EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 70, Section 8-II(C)(2).
208. Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203-04 (2d Cir. 2003).
209. Glover, 170 F.3d at 414.
210. Id. at 414-15.
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In a case on point, the Middle District of North Carolina held in
dicta that:
Disclosure of confidential information in response to a formal request
for production would arguably receive extensive protection under Title
VII because the court could take steps to protect the business interests
of the employer by sealing documents, issuing protective orders,
restricting the admissibility of evidence at trial, and conducting in
camera proceedings where appropriate.211

Courts should not separate irrelevant documents from the objective
act of producing those documents.212 When you have a formal discovery
request, there are sufficient safeguards in place within the court system
to protect employers from an employee producing confidential
documents.213
E.

Effect on Title VII Discovery

One purpose of the anti-retaliation provision is to allow a person to
have the freedom to communicate discrimination concerns with her
employer.214 “[E]ffective enforcement could thus only be expected if
employees felt free to approach officials with their grievances.”215
Placing conditions on discovery will not facilitate such communication
and could impose hurdles on a plaintiff proving her case.216 “[T]he
imposition of unnecessary limitations on discovery is especially to be
avoided in Title VII cases, because of the nature of the proofs required to
demonstrate unlawful discrimination may often be indirect or
circumstantial.”217

211. Shoaf v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 746, 757 (M.D.N.C. 2003). The court in
Shoaf found against the plaintiff primarily because she produced the documents outside a formal
production request. See id.
212. Glover, 170 F.3d at 415.
213. Indeed, one of Niswander’s arguments was that the protective order protected her
disclosure from causing any harm to CIC and thus CIC lacked sufficient motivation to fire her.
Final Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 28. “The parties had adopted a Stipulated Protective
Order under which either party could mark documents confidential placing those documents under
the protective order at the time of production. If CIC was truly concerned about confidentiality and
privacy, it would have marked the documents confidential under the protective order, but it did not.”
Id.
214. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
215. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)).
216. Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 117, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
217. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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Furthermore, the ruling in Niswander arguably creates perverse
incentives.218 The ruling encourages defendants to make overly broad
requests for discovery in hopes that the plaintiff may violate the
company’s privacy policy.219 At that point, the defendant will have a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to terminate the plaintiff.220 In fact,
CIC terminated three of the equal pay litigants for allegedly violating its
code of conduct.221
Alternatively, plaintiffs will be reluctant to freely produce a
document where the document’s relevance is questionable.222 Plaintiffs
will have to vigorously examine all documents turned over in discovery
in order to ensure that anti-retaliation protection remains in place.223
While a plaintiff is not free to flood a defendant with irrelevant
discovery,224 defendants should also not be able to hold plaintiffs under
Damocles’s sword, terminating a plaintiff upon production of a single
irrelevant document.225
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit’s decision could impede the discovery
process in EEOC actions.226 The policy for allowing irrelevant
deposition testimony is equally applicable to allowing irrelevant
production of documents:
[T]o adopt a reasonableness restriction would lead the federal courts
into a morass of collateral litigation in employment discrimination
cases. With her immunity limited by a reasonableness requirement, a
witness might be forced to evade or to refuse to answer deposition
questions. And those questions can be wide-ranging . . . . The
inevitable clashes between inquisitive deposing attorneys and
recalcitrant witnesses will spawn discovery motions and appeals, all to
be litigated in the courts. The resulting waste of individual and judicial
resources would be far inferior to a system in which discovery

218. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
222. Glover v. South Carolina Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 415 (4th Cir. 1999).
223. Id.
224. Because a response to a formal request to produce documents must be signed by an
attorney, flooding an opponent with irrelevant discovery can be sanctioned under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11(c). The rule explicitly prohibits the filing of any signed writing that is
“presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). Federal judges may also sanction improper
conduct in discovery under FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b).
225. Glover, 170 F.3d at 415.
226. Id.
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proceeds unfettered, with witnesses confident that they cannot be
227
punished for telling their tales.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision could cause the rate of discovery to
slow because plaintiffs will be forced to meticulously analyze every
document passed to a defendant.228 Likewise, defendants will be
encouraged to request overly broad discovery.229 More discovery battles
will occur where a plaintiff refuses to turn over a document when its
relevance is questionable.230 The potential for wasting judicial resources
is great.231 The better policy is to allow broad, unimpeded discovery.232
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Niswander and its recent
adoption in other districts,233 the lawyer pursuing a Title VII claim for
234
Plaintiffs’ lawyers should fully
his client should be on guard.
understand their client’s employer’s confidentiality policy before
advising their client to take any action which may jeopardize her
employment.235 Lawyers should also thoroughly counsel their clients as

227. Id.
228. Id. One possibility to counteract such a result would be to adopt a rule akin to Federal
Rule of Evidence 502(b), which was adopted in response to the concern that inadvertent disclosure
of privileged documents would act as a waiver of attorney-client privilege. FED. R. EVID. 502
advisory committee’s note. Rule 502(b) resolved the split over whether privilege could be restored
after inadvertent disclosure. Id. One concern was that to do otherwise would grind document
production to a halt while parties examined privilege, page by page. Id.
The rule does not require the producing party to engage in a post-production review to
determine whether any protected communication or information has been produced by
mistake. But the rule does require the producing party to follow up on any obvious
indications that a protected communication or information has been produced
inadvertently.
Id.
229. Glover, 170 F.3d at 415.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See Harris v. Richland Community Health Care Ass’n, Inc., No. 3:07-0421-CMC-PJG,
slip op. (D.S.C. Sept. 14, 2009) (finding Niswander instructive and adopting a reasonableness
requirement when confidential documents are distributed outside of discovery); Quinlan v. CurtissWright Corp., 976 A.2d 429 (N.J. Super. 2009) (declining protection for an employee’s copying of
confidential documents pre-suit); Johnson v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 682 F. Supp. 2d
560 (E.D. Va. 2009) (adopting Niswander’s six-factor test in declining protection to an employee
who disseminated documents to his attorney). Although these cases are factually distinct from
Niswander, they evidence a trend toward greater protection of employer confidentiality and thus,
less protection for the Title VII plaintiff.
234. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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to how the client may search for, and subsequently produce documents
236
If confidential
they come across in their continued employment.
documents exist, the employee may provide the attorney with a synopsis
of such documents so that the attorney may formally request their
production.237 Counseling should include a specific warning that clients
are not to go through confidential employer files for the purpose of
litigation unless specifically authorized to do so.238
Besides counseling the client, lawyers should request clarification
when an employer’s request for production is overly broad and may
involve confidential documents.239 When drafting a protective order in
a Title VII case, lawyers for both sides should anticipate that
confidential documents relating to the case may be in the hands of the
employee and should draft language protecting the employee’s
240
Lawyers should also ensure that any
dissemination accordingly.
confidential documents produced are marked as confidential.241
As courts either adopt or reject relevance standards in Title VII
participation, judges should consider protective orders as an alternative
method for protecting employer confidentiality.242 When an employee
is participating in good faith, the employee should be able to establish a
243
If an employee’s conduct shows cause
prima facie case of retaliation.
for concern, the better analysis is not to deny that she was in fact
participating, but instead to analyze whether her employer had a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment.244
Combining a good faith standard in participation with a pretext analysis
will both protect an employee who is legitimately participating in a Title
VII action and provide the employer with protection when it has a
legitimate reason for terminating a Title VII participant.245

236. Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 722 (6th Cir. 2008). See supra note 49
and accompanying text.
237. Johnson, 682 F.Supp.2d at 582.
238. See supra notes 25, 149-53 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 22-24, 49-51 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 18, 164-69 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 161-62, 182-84 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 118-60 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 172-92 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 118-60, 172-92 and accompanying text.
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